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This Is Not An Island 
By Professor Alex de Ruyter, Director, Centre for Brexit Studies, 
Birmingham City University 
Returning from the (brilliant) Regional Studies Association Annual 
Conference in Santiago de Compostela in Spain last week, I had 
plenty of time on the journey home to muse on the issues of borders 
and regions that were discussed at the conference. It was also 
pleasing to see David Hearne present work based on our recently 
released book Regional Success After Brexit: the Need for New 
Measures (Emerald Publishing – which is freely available to read on-
line thanks to Knowledge Unlatched funding support). 
In this context I particularly enjoyed the closing plenary presentation 
and discussion from Professor Anssi Paasi providing critical insights 
into the overlap between regional studies and border studies as 
evolving fields of scholarly enquiry. Just the very premise of 
discussion of borders, at one level, to me reinforced the view in my 
mind of disruptive events such as Brexit as necessarily undermining 
teleological accounts of history that would posit some type of 
(idealised) socio-economic end state that the world would reach. 
I am thinking specifically of “hyperglobalists” such as Francis 
Fukuyama and Thomas Friedman, who collared much of the 
academic debate in these areas and generated much publicity for 
themselves in doing so. Fukuyama will be remembered particularly for 
his provocative book title “The End of History”, which now well and 
truly will be judged as premature. If anything, events such as Brexit, 
the presidency of Donald Trump in the US, and an upsurge of 
“populist” movements around the world have demonstrated, is that 
history is full of surprises and upsets to the established order of 
things. 
Who in 1987 for example (beyond a narrow coterie of Sovietologists, 
perhaps) would have predicted that the Berlin Wall would come down 
in 1989 and the subsequent break-up of the USSR two years after 
that? All of which makes me realise just how territorial units should be 
seen as constantly being in flux, almost kaleidoscopic in terms of their 
exposure to forces outside and within. 
In that sense, the established tri-polar order of today, with the “global 
triad” of Europe, the US and East Asia (principally, China and Japan) 
as described by international business scholars such as Peter Dicken 
(“Global Shifts”) should not be taken as a permanent feature of the 
politico-economic landscape (as Dicken illustrated in his seminal 
book). Europe in particular, with the grouping of 28 (soon to be 27?) 
nation states under the EU is particularly fragile as a cohesive 
territorial unit at this point in time. 
Although, of course, as we have written in these blog pages before, 
there is nothing especial or permanent about nation-states, the UK 
included. As it is, it is a construct of four “home nations” (England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) plus a number of British 
Overseas Territories / Crown Dependencies (Channel Islands, Isle of 
Man, Gibraltar etc.), each with varying degrees of devolved power. 
These sub-nations in themselves represent the outcomes of power 
struggles between earlier territorial units of competing elites, with 
Scotland for example forming over the course of about the period 800 
AD to 1300 AD, with various “peoples” (Picts, Brythonic/Welsh Celts, 
Gaelic Celts, Angles, Vikings, Normans and Flemish etc.) coming 
together under a single monarchy as realised through the Scottish 
wars of independence against the “English” (or to be more precise, 
the French-speaking Plantagenet rulers of England) in the period 
1290 – 1320. 
Though to stress again, there was nothing pre-ordained about this, 
and territorial configuration of “Britain” could easily have been different 
(depending on the outcome of battles that could have swung either 
way, or the death of a capable ruler and replacement with an 
incompetent one and so on). 
In a similar fashion, England split away from the Roman Catholic 
domain in the 16th Century because its then ruler, Henry VIII, 
repudiated the authority of the Pope to allow him to divorce Catherine 
of Aragon. It has been argued by a number of commentators that this 
“divorce” from Catholic Christendom and subsequent growth of 
islander exceptionalism and a feeling of distance from them “over 
there on the Continent” constituted the “First Brexit”. 
However, there was nothing pre-ordained about this and had Henry 
had more luck in producing a male heir in his first marriage then it is 
possible that England would not have embraced the Protestant 
Reformation at all. 
Which goes to show that Brexit can hardly be seen as a national 
reawakening against an over-mighty European hegemon. England 
and the rest of the UK have all been closely connected with proximate 
countries and the wider European domain at previous points in 
history. England in the 15th Century was ruled by French-speaking 
monarchs who waged war (the “Hundred Years War”) to assert their 
claim to the French Crown; a French-descended (and still largely 
French-speaking) nobility imported from the Norman Conquest in 
1066 and there was widespread use of Latin by the clergy and 
scholarly communities. 
These individuals saw themselves as part of a wider Christendom and 
in no way separate. During these periods, the English Channel was 
seen as more of a highway than a barrier and British (francophone) 
elites looked to the mainland for their political and cultural inspiration. 
If we cast our kaleidoscope back just blink of an eye further (in 
geological time terms) then the British Isles as they are today have 
only existed since the end of the last Ice Age (about 10,000 years 
ago), and Britain was linked to the rest of Europe with dry land. 
Cast our kaleidoscope further back in time, the lands that would 
become Britain formed parts of separate continents: Laurentia (which 
contained “Scotland” and much of North America) 
and Avalonia (which contained “England” and “Wales” and bits of 
France and Germany) that collided in the Palaeozoic era – a process 
known as the Caledonian Orogeny, which created the Scottish 
Highlands.[1] 
Viewed in the prism of geological time then, our current island status 
is but a short-term illusion. In the human epoch, the island status of 
the UK for most of the period since the end of the last Ice Age has not 
even been close to something all-defining against the rest of Europe. 
Even today, we continue to make countless journeys across the 
Channel to the mainland, thousands of us have properties in France 
and Spain for example, and we delight in European culture (as the 
Regional Studies Association Annual Conference enabled me to do). 
When even leading Brexiteers have opted to take out citizenship in 
another EU country – QED Nigel Lawson applying for French 
citizenship, and Nigel Farage encouraging his children to take out 
German citizenship by dint of his wife’s nationality – one would have 
to ask what then is the separatist logic of Brexit? I could well counter 
by saying that “this country is not an island”.  The borders we see and 
construct are fluid and change over time (the EU at least is an attempt 
to break down borders). 
[1] https://www.geolsoc.org.uk/Plate-Tectonics/Chap4-Plate-
Tectonics-of-the-UK/Variscan-Orogeny. 
As an interesting aside, the distinctive terrain of Devon and Cornwall 
and South Wales coalfields were created as a result of the 
Variscan/Hercynian Orogeny of mountain-building that occurred after 
this as Gondwana collided with this proto-Europe some 290 million 
years ago (ibid.). 
 
